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In an agency relationship, one party acts on behalf of another. It is curious that a concept that could not be more profoundly sociological does not have a niche in the sociological literature. This essay begins with the economics paradigm of agency theory, which casts a very long shadow over the social sciences, and then traces how these ideas diffuse to and are transformed (if at all) in the scholarship produced in business schools, political science, law, and sociology. I cut a swathe through the social fabric where agency relationships are especially prevalent and examine some of the institutions, roles, forms of social organization, deviance, and strategies of social control that deliver agency and respond to its vulnerabilities, and I consider their impact. Finally, I suggest how sociology might make better use of and contribute to agency theory.

AbstractWe extend an influential contribution to the literature on agency theory and then use this extension, along with other theoretical contributions, to shed light on agency problems affecting funds management and financial planning in Australia. The case for pure fee‐for‐service in actively managed funds and plans turns out to be weak. The amount of money exposed to risk by an active manager should be less than the entire investible wealth of the client, especially in the case of investors on the cusp of retirement. Asset‐based fees on actively managed funds should include a fulcrum component.

"This book explores and critically reflects on the theory and practice of political agency in contemporary global politics. In light of the changing relationship between the state, the market and the society, it seeks to map both theoretically and empirically contemporary forms of global political agency. This book reflects on the theory and practice of political agency in contemporary global politics. More specifically, it empirically analyses a range of different forms of political agency and explores their significance for understanding and enacting global politics. Reflecting the efforts of scholars from a variety of disciplines from political theory and Sociology to Geography and International Relations, it brings into conversation a wide spectrum of theoretical approaches including Marxism, feminism, post-structuralism and historical institutionalism. The contributors compare a range of forms of political agency; exploring their significance for the theory and practice of global politics; and reflect on the tensions and synergies generated by recent efforts to conceptualise them. Demonstrating an innovative and interdisciplinary approach Contemporary Political Agency will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, sociology, political economy and political theory"--

1. Political agency and subjectivity in the crisis of modernity / Debora Spini -- 2. Political agency between urban and transnational spaces / Clive Barnett -- 3. Judicial agency in the building of the European Union : a comparison of the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court / Derek Beach -- 4. Political agency in the economy : cooperatives, solidarity and territory in Euskadi and Aquitaine / Xabier Itcaina -- 5. Political agency and the responsibility paradox : multinationals and corporate social responsibility / Gerald F. Davis, Marina von Neumann Whitman and Mayer N. Zald -- 6. Exploring the conditions of possibility for political agency : rethinking politicization from a feminist perspective / Bice Maiguashca -- 7. Radical political agency : affective politics in the case of the Zapatistas of Chiapas / Susa McManus -- 8. Social infrastructures of political agency : the political mobilization of the women of the market in Lome / Charles Heller and Branwen Gruffydd Jones.

The primary objective of this article is to develop a framework for examining the survival or demise of an accounting standards setting body, with specific emphasis on analyzing the survival potential of the proposed GASB (Government Accounting Standards Board). In meeting this objective, we will first contrast the survival of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the demise of the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASE), based on a framework derived from recent developments in agency theory.The position taken in this article is neither that of an advocate nor an adversary of the various accounting regulatory bodies discussed. Instead, the authors' intent is to shed light on the complex issues surrounding the potential for survival of such bodies. An improved understanding of these issues should, in turn, permit a more enlightened analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of such bodies.